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The headquarters for Wal-Mart, the world’s larg-
est company, are set in a commercial strip on the 
edge of a small town in northwest Arkansas. The 
five and dime Sam Walton started is preserved as 
a company visitor’s center.
The Sears Holdings corporate headquarters occu-
pies a 200-acre campus (that) … offers natural 
prairie lands, ponds and waterfalls, walking/jog-
ging paths and athletic fields. The facility offers 
award-winning food service, coffee shops, child-
care, wellness and fitness centers, automotive 
center, sample store, hair salon, sundry shop, 
bank, insurance agency, pharmacy, box office, 
dry cleaner and concierge services.
Wal-Mart takes great pride in its folksy roots, and its lack of ostentatious display is a con-
scious decision about how to present its identity. 
By preserving the five and dime, Wal-Mart is say-
ing something important about what the company 
is and how it operates. In contrast, the Sears Hold-
ings’ sleek campus and its array of amenities make 
a statement about the company’s identity, its sense 
of self as a modern, progressive company.
All organizations have identities much the way 
all people have identities. An organization’s iden-
tity develops over time as it adapts to both environ-
mental and internal pressures, and what emerges 
is the collection of central and enduring attributes 
that make an organization unique and distinguish-
able from its competitors. Expressed through poli-
cies, procedures, and behaviors, the organization’s 
identity reflects the values and beliefs that lie at its 
core. Wal-Mart and Sears, both mass market retail-
ers, look different, feel different, and their employ-
ees behave differently because the companies proj-
ect different identities.
Organizations, like people, are motivated to pro-
tect their identities and they do this by rewarding 
behaviors that will sustain a positive sense of self 
and reduce collective anxieties. The effort to pro-
tect identity can become fixated on relieving anxi-
ety, and when this happens, the identity itself takes 
on the qualities of narcissism.
Narcissism is a term that describes a person who 
is self-absorbed. A narcissist displays a sense of 
self-importance, fantasizes obsessively about suc-
cess and power, assumes a strong sense of unique-
ness, lacks empathy, and often exploits or takes 
advantage of others. These behaviors protect the 
narcissist’s identity and fragile self-esteem.
Entire organizations can also become self-absorbed 
and focus on protecting an identity that has taken on 
narcissistic qualities. Every organization develops 
distinctive preferences, commitments, and practices 
that reflect collectively shared assumptions or ide-
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Abstract
In order to protect their identities, organizations can become self-obsessed and display extreme narcissistic behav-
iors, which will, in the long run, lead to decline. Extreme narcissism can take two forms. The high self-esteem nar-
cissistic organization institutionalizes an exalted sense of self-worth and becomes blind to its weaknesses. The low 
self-esteem narcissistic organization institutionalizes a profound sense of unworthiness and becomes blind to its own 
strengths. In between the extremes an organization can remain reality-based and institutionalize a healthy sense of 
self-worth and value. Enron exhibited many characteristics of the high self-esteem narcissistic organization, while 
Salomon Brothers exhibited characteristics of the low self-esteem narcissistic organization. Both organizations failed. 
Liz Claiborne has prospered because it demonstrates characteristics of the reality-based, healthy narcissist.
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ologies about its identity, and the organization will 
reward people who best manifest that identity. These 
identity-capturing behaviors once reinforced will be 
imitated by others and so, over time, become institu-
tionalized. We argue in this paper that extreme forms 
of organizational narcissism can harm organizations 
and even destroy them.
The extreme narcissistic organization becomes 
preoccupied with itself and its anxieties, and loses 
touch with its clients and markets. Self-absorption 
becomes an everyday practice, and the organiza-
tion uses self-aggrandizement, a sense of entitlement, 
and denial to project what has become an extreme 
narcissistic identity. Self-aggrandizement, enti-
tlement, and denial replace rational, reality-based 
decision-making.
For example, the once successful hedge fund 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) trig-
gered a financial panic by accumulating $4.6 bil-
lion in debt between May and September 1998, 
and only an intervention by Federal Reserve Bank 
saved it from collapse. The company’s crisis was 
caused not by poor talent or a lack of information, 
but rather by its own narcissism. LTCM’s part-
ners collectively displayed self-aggrandizement 
by believing that they possessed knowledge and 
capabilities far beyond those of any other hedge-
fund managers. They collectively saw themselves 
as both omnipotent and omniscient in that they 
believed their method of “Value at Risk” calcu-
lations allowed them to predict and control the 
future. This collective sense of entitlement led 
the partners to take enormous investment risks 
in areas such as the Russian economy in which it 
had no previous experience. Between January and 
August 1998 LTCM’s leverage ratio reached 50:1 
(when 2:1 was the industry norm), and it had off-
balance-sheet positions worth an additional $1.25 
trillion. Even as the markets collapsed around 
them, the partners denied the reality of their pre-
carious situation and instead were driven to prove 
LTCM’s identity of superiority and dominance.
Extreme organizational narcissism takes two 
forms, based either on high or low self-esteem. A 
third form of narcissism we call healthy narcis-
sism characterizes organizations that protect their 
identities by being self-confident, not self-aggran-
dizing, that earn success rather than believe them-
selves entitled to it, and that use data to inform 
rather then deny. Examples of high self-esteem 
narcissism, low self-esteem narcissism and healthy 
narcissism appear in Enron, Salomon Brothers, and 
Liz Claiborne companies, respectively. Analysis of 
these companies reveals the unique behaviors they 
employ to protect their identities.
Extreme organizational narcissism
An organization in the grip of extreme narcis-
sism loses sight of the “reality” of its position in 
the marketplace and employs denial, self-aggran-
dizement, and a sense of entitlement to prop up its 
damaged sense of identity. For example, the orga-
nization denies facts about itself through spokes-
people, press releases, and annual reports. It devel-
ops plausible and acceptable justifications for its 
actions through rationalization. An extreme nar-
cissistic organization self-aggrandizes by endow-
ing itself with a sense of rightness, and by mak-
ing claims of its uniqueness even in the face of con-
tradictory evidence. This is accomplished in sev-
eral ways. For example, the organization com-
missions flattering corporate histories, executives 
make speeches embedded with claims of unique-
ness, and it deploys office layouts and architec-
ture as expressions of status, prestige, and van-
ity. An extreme narcissistic organization takes on a 
sense of entitlement that is accompanied by a lack 
of empathy and a willingness to exploit others. It 
assumes that it is entitled to continued success, and 
can exploit resources, people, and other organiza-
tions in the service of that success.
Such extreme self-absorption, however, will take 
on different manifestations depending on whether 
the organization is a high self-esteem or low self-
esteem narcissist. Essentially, the high self-esteem 
narcissistic organization is characterized by exces-
sive self-esteem, an exalted sense of self, and 
becomes blind to its weaknesses. In contrast, the 
low self-esteem organization suffers from a pro-
found sense of inferiority and becomes blind to its 
strengths. In either case, the self-absorbed organi-
zation is no longer reality-based, and an identity 
that had once provided a competitive advantage 
turns into a competitive disadvantage.
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High and low self-esteem narcissism
Table 1 presents the differences between high 
self-esteem and low self-esteem narcissistic orga-
nizations in terms of entitlement, self-aggrandize-
ment, and denial. Table 1 also presents the char-
acteristics of a “healthy” narcissistic organiza-
tion: one that is reality-based, open to feedback 
and self-respecting. Table 1 is illustrative rather 
than exhaustive, and offers a framework for 
diagnosing/explaining organizational health or 
dysfunction.
For example, Long Term Capital Management 
exhibited the collective behaviors of high self-
esteem narcissism. In contrast, the FBI near the end 
of J. Edgar Hoover’s life exhibited the qualities of a 
low self-esteem narcissistic organization.
Below we analyze three different organiza-
tions in terms of their organizational narcissism 
traits.
Enron: an example of high self-esteem 
narcissism
The Enron Corporation’s bankruptcy in 2001, 
the subsequent prosecution of many of its top exec-
utives, and the demise of its auditing firm Arthur 
Andersen, has become a cautionary tale in Amer-
ican business: even the mighty can fall quickly. 
Extreme high self-esteem narcissism was a central 
and enduring trait at Enron, and this trait informed 
commonly shared assumptions about what con-
stituted acceptable, appropriate, even necessary 
behavior. Institutionalized narcissism enabled 
unethical and illegal practices.
Anxiety of mythic proportions
Kurt Eichenwald’s book “Conspiracy of Fools” 
(2005) provides an inside view of an organization 
that seems, in retrospect, obsessed with its own 
undoing. “Crime was just one ingredient in a toxic 
stew (of) shocking incompetence, unjustified arro-
gance, compromised ethics, and an utter contempt 
for the market’s judgment,” Eichenwald reports, 
“Ultimately it was Enron’s tragedy to be filled with 
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people smart enough to know how to maneuver 
around the rules, but not wise enough to under-
stand why the rules had been written in the first 
place.” Those people were “not wise” because they 
were operating in an extreme narcissistic environ-
ment that encouraged displays of entitlement, cel-
ebrated self-aggrandizement, and systematically 
denied that anything was out of order.
We are Entitled to Success
People at Enron skirted the rules because the 
“rules” didn’t apply to them: the message was that 
the people at Enron were entitled to success and 
riches. Consider that market-trading prices did not 
dictate the value of contracts at Enron. Instead, the 
company created and used its own projections for 
anticipated income. Fees were treated as a return 
on investment. Such a calculation lowered capi-
tal investment costs and artificially raised returns. 
No one objected to this practice. Conflicts of inter-
est were of little concern. For example, the finance 
group created its own little world where buyers 
(i.e., the clients they represented) worked hard to 
protect the interest of sellers (i.e., Enron). The com-
pany side-stepped conventional accounting prac-
tices when it seemed profitable to do so. For exam-
ple, Enron devised its own variation of Mark 
to Market accounting such that contracts were 
assigned the value of anticipated future profits, 
not current market prices. That the future profits 
might not actually be realized didn’t matter. Enron 
believed itself entitled to a healthy-looking balance 
sheet.
Self-aggrandizing Fantasies of Success
Enron saw itself changing the world, and exec-
utives and employees were not shy about mak-
ing sure that the world was aware of the changes. 
Boasting and bragging became institutionalized. 
For example, executives often spoke with messi-
anic fervor about the new order they hoped to cre-
ate: they were going to take power away from the 
monopolies, finance the dying gas industry, and 
create new markets that didn’t exist before. Jeffrey 
Skilling’s group liked to show off. They liked being 
known as the best and the brightest—analysts 
who tore apart the company in search of excessive 
risks and the associated high returns. The group 
indulged themselves with flashy, sleek offices that 
were meant to symbolize the smart, gifted people 
they believed themselves to be. Others in the com-
pany did not shy away from exhibitionism: pri-
vate jets and expensive parties were a normal part 
of the Enron’s self-display. In 1999, Enron attracted 
further attention to itself by paying $100 million 
for the naming rights to the Houston Astros new 
stadium.
Denial: The Data are Wrong
A sense of entitlement and a need to self-aggran-
dize become exaggerated over time because a nar-
cissistic organization practices a collective form 
of denial. The feedback loop is severed and any 
evidence that might threaten the organization’s 
self-regard is never “seen” or is simply ignored. 
Most egregiously, the company ignored evidence 
of fraud and insider trading for years, and later 
denied responsibility for such practices. Top exec-
utives were seen to surround themselves with yes-
men who were careful not to pass along bad news. 
International project development businesses rou-
tinely presented absurdly inflated project values 
and used improper accounting as a cover-up. One 
executive tried to share his concerns about such 
behavior with CEO Ken Lay. Within minutes he 
was ushered out the door and never heard any-
thing back.
Denial was an important aspect of Enron’s par-
ticipation in the catastrophic Dabhol Power Proj-
ect in India. The project was so large and politi-
cally complicated that the company decided it 
needed former Secretary of State James Baker as a 
consultant. Baker proved to be less than enthusi-
astic about the project, and his report raised many 
red flags, particularly about the Indian govern-
ment’s lack of commitment. The report was filed 
away and largely forgotten. However, most of 
the dangers Baker warned about materialized: a 
newly elected Indian government refused to sup-
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port Dabhol. The project was on the chopping 
block as Secretary Baker predicted, yet no one in 
the company had seen (or was willing to accept) 
the possibility of such an outcome. Instead of a 
prudent retreat, however, the company decided 
to double its bet on India, a move celebrated in 
Houston as a grand slam homerun. As is the 
norm in high esteem narcissistic organizations, 
the risks of such a rash move were hardly consid-
ered After all, the international division’s projec-
tions said Dabhol was a sure winner. Never mind 
that all the previous projections about Dabhol had 
been off the mark: the company was in denial. 
Altogether, Enron lost about $900 million on the 
project.
Salomon brothers: an example of low  
self-esteem narcissism
In contrast to the grandiose, exhibitionistic behav-
iors found in a high self-esteem narcissistic orga-
nization, the low self-esteem narcissistic organiza-
tion is characterized by an environment that is self-
denying, secretive, and projects a profound sense 
of unworthiness. See Table 1.
Anxiety and alienation
Michael Lewis’s book “Liar’s Poker” (1990) pro-
vides an insider’s account of the low self-esteem 
environment at investment bank Salomon Broth-
ers. While investment banking is an occupation not 
generally associated with low self-esteem behavior, 
the example applies here because Salomon Broth-
ers seems to have been different. “Salomon was, 
in 1985, a profitable company as a result of deal-
ing in bonds (but not junk bonds),” Lewis writes. 
“[Before deregulation], Wall Street had been con-
tent to let Salomon Brothers be the best bond trad-
ers because that was considered neither profitable 
nor prestigious. What was profitable was raising 
capital. What was prestigious was knowing lots of 
corporate CEOs. Salomon was a social and finan-
cial outlier.”
Deregulation threw the company off-track. 
Instead of objectively analyzing opportunities and 
threats, the Salomon Brothers Lewis writes about 
became obsessed with its own anxieties. The orga-
nization projected a profound sense of unworthi-
ness which hardened into a kind of cynicism that 
was used to justify unethical behavior. In 1991 Salo-
mon Brothers was caught trying to acquire more 
U.S. Treasury bonds than was legally allowed. The 
scandal, combined with a fine that was the larg-
est ever imposed on an investment bank up to that 
time, proved to be the company’s undoing.
“Salomon Brothers was at the crossroads of 
change,” Lewis writes, “but all the time wearing 
a blindfold. It lacked an accurate vision of where 
the explosion in the bond market would lead (and) 
from 1985 onward it took what must be one of 
the most expensive and fanciful commercial rides 
in the history of the American corporation.” Each 
problem, instead of being seen as an opportunity 
for reform and change, only reinforced a sense of 
unworthiness and inevitable doom, a sense that 
was fulfilled because Salomon got itself into legal 
difficulties and ceased operating as an indepen-
dent company in 1991.
Self-denying: Fear of Failure
Instead of over-estimating itself the way Enron did, 
Salomon Brothers systematically underestimated 
itself by projecting an image as social nonentities. 
For example, a top executive told the following 
self-deprecating story during a training session: At 
cocktail parties lovely ladies would corner me and 
ask my opinion of the market, but, alas, when they 
learned I was a bond man, they would quietly drift 
away. The training relentlessly stressed that peo-
ple keep their heads down: the quickest way to be 
fired was to appear in the press boasting. Even suc-
cessful people were expected to undervalue their 
accomplishments. One successful trader explained 
his success by noting that “… in the land of the 
blind the one-eyed man is king.”
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We Don’t Deserve Success
Because Salomon Brothers’ identity is character-
ized by low self-esteem, its presentation will be 
different, almost entirely opposite, from Enron’s 
presentation. For example, entitlement at Enron 
meant that the company and its managers acted 
as if they were entitled to success and special 
accommodations in the marketplace. The inward-
focus at Salomon Brothers meant that the com-
pany and its managers expected success to elude 
them and they turned their frustrations on them-
selves. They acted out by enforcing a regime 
of terror and abuse; a corporate version of com-
ing home mad and kicking the dog. Bond traders 
ruled the shop, and their tyranny over salesmen 
was institutionalized. A favorite trick was start-
ing rumors that all the sales people were going 
to be fired. Analysts were expected to be work-
ing all the time; they rarely slept and often looked 
ill. It seemed the better they got at their jobs, the 
nearer they appeared to death. A kind of protec-
tion game emerged where the weak sought to find 
favor and protection from the strong who were, of 
course, the biggest bullies. Management assumed 
seigniorial privileges. Their offices on the 41st 
floor were served by private elevators, and com-
munication was accomplished over the phone. A 
staff person on the 40th floor was no closer to his/
her manager than a staff person in Dallas. The 
company felt no loyalty to its staff. You want loy-
alty, one staff member noted, hire a cocker span-
iel. Everyone felt entitled to treat customers with 
disdain. “I spent much of my time inventing log-
ical lies,” Lewis notes, “Most of the time when 
markets move, no one had any idea why. A man 
who can tell a good story can make a good living 
as a broker.”
Denial: The Data Can’t Be Trusted
Enron practiced denial in order not to pay atten-
tion to reality and thus continue disastrous, 
often illegal, practices. At Salomon Brothers, 
denial was used to justify managerial paralysis. 
In both cases, the feedback loop was severed or 
ignored, but Salomon Brothers turned on itself. 
“The plain fact,” Lewis writes, “was that a com-
bination of market forces and gross mismanage-
ment had thrown Salomon Brothers into deep 
trouble. At times it was as if we had no manage-
ment at all. No one put a stop to the infighting; 
no one gave a sense of direction … no one wanted 
to make the hard decisions that business men, 
like generals, simply have to make.” Denial also 
took the form of scape-goating. The bosses were 
inclined to blame their lieutenants for poor exe-
cution of a brilliant plan rather than question the 
plan itself. The “grunts,” Lewis notes, were bet-
ter able to diagnose the company’s problems than 
the “generals.” Sales people who spent all day on 
the phone with customers saw drastic changes in 
the market to which management was blind, but 
one could not attempt to persuade management 
of this sad fact. Its response would have been to 
shoot the messenger. Lewis seems to be describ-
ing a organization that is arguing about rearrang-
ing deck chairs on the Titanic rather than face the 
reality of a sinking ship.
The point with both the Enron and Salomon 
Brothers examples is that extreme narcissism will 
produce such a dysfunctional work environment 
that legal troubles and business failure are eas-
ily predictable outcomes, even if that business had 
once enjoyed great success and acclaim. Also, the 
examples show that reactions to collective anxi-
ety take on a different presentation depending on 
whether the extreme narcissism is characterized by 
high self-esteem or low self-esteem.
Liz Claiborne: Healthy narcissism
As presented in Table 1 it is possible to see that a 
form of functional narcissism resides somewhere 
between the extremes. The organization that man-
ages to avoid narcissistic extremes can be said to 
be a healthy narcissist. Such organizations are 
reality-based and, overtime, show themselves 
to be worthy of trust and reliance. An organiza-
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tion with a healthy, authentic sense of self-val-
ues knowledge and awareness rather than denial, 
seeks justice and fair play rather than entitlement, 
and encourages self-confidence rather than self-
aggrandizement. Healthy organizational narcis-
sism enhances and builds the value of others in 
the organization and seeks to maximize benefits 
for the largest number of people without exploita-
tion. Such an organization can value and reward 
high performance, but not become overly exhibi-
tionistic about doing so. Certainly, healthy nar-
cissistic organizations are subject to uncertain-
ties and anxieties, they make mistakes, but are 
better able to cope with and adapt to these pres-
sures than extreme narcissistic organizations. A 
healthy narcissistic organization shows resilience. 
As a metaphor, the extreme high self-esteem nar-
cissist loves itself too much and is blind to its own 
weaknesses. The low self-esteem narcissist hates 
itself too much and is blind to its own strengths. 
The healthy narcissist is aware of and proud of its 
strengths and, at the same time, it is aware of and 
tries to overcome its weaknesses.
Mindful assessment
The healthy narcissistic organization remains fact-
oriented and tries to discover the “truth” of a sit-
uation by examining both supporting and discon-
firming evidence. The healthy organization is open 
to the possibility that it enjoyed a success because 
of luck, or a failure because of its own mistakes. A 
healthy organization’s identity will not be unduly 
threatened by a short term failure because it pos-
sesses a healthy confidence that it will succeed in 
the long term. Because it is reality-based, a healthy 
organization will be much more open to change 
than its dysfunctional counterparts.
For example, under the leadership of Jack 
Welch, General Electric exhibited healthy narcissis-
tic behaviors and experienced success that proved 
to be beneficial to shareholders and most stake-
holders. To be sure, working as a manager for GE 
was not necessarily pleasant because the company 
so valued performance that a kind of Darwinian 
survival of the fittest model informed decision-
making. Yet the performance driven environment 
did not have room for denial because managers 
had to take responsibility and be open to bad news 
in order to keep their operations on track. Yes-peo-
ple were not rewarded, and although it was a com-
petitive environment, it was also a transparent one 
where excessive self-aggrandizing and entitlement 
would not have flourished.
Consider how the healthy narcissism at Liz 
Claiborne has kept the company on-track first 
through its years of rapid growth, and then it 
was able to rebound in the late 1990s following a 
sharp decline in both sales and profits. The com-
pany designs and markets branded women’s and 
men’s apparel, fragrances, and accessories. It 
was founded in 1976 by Liz Claiborne, her hus-
band Al Ortenberg, and two other partners, and 
enjoyed great success from its inception. The com-
pany went public in 1981 and, in 1986, became the 
first on the Fortune 500 list founded by a woman. 
Beginning in 1992, however, the company was 
unable to respond effectively to market changes 
and it suffered a three-year decline where its mar-
ket capitalization fell from $3.5 billion to $1.2 bil-
lion. Management instituted a series of opera-
tional and marketing changes, and the market 
capitalization rebounded to $3.2 billion by 1997. 
By 2007 company sales approached $5 billion.
While the company has benefited from mar-
keting and supply chain innovations, our argu-
ment is that the company’s healthy narcissism 
played an important role both in its growth and 
its ability to respond to market changes. In con-
trast, Salomon Brothers, because of its low self-
esteem narcissism, was able neither to recognize 
nor respond to changes in its industry. A healthy 
narcissist protects its identity by remaining real-
ity based, and it does not fall prey to denial or 
engage in excessive displays of entitlement or 
self-aggrandizement.
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Aspire To Success Rather Than Self-aggrandize
The company did not seem to be one that was 
either overly self-aggrandizing or self-denying. For 
example, company headquarters were housed in a 
stylish but not, in comparison to Enron, overly lav-
ish building near Times Square in New York City. 
The building’s décor features clean lines, lots of 
pure white, and is not ostentatious or attention-
grabbing. While the staff’s attire was not “button 
down,” they tended to dress in Liz Claiborne fash-
ions. Executives avoided the limelight and gave 
interviews to the press strictly for business reasons. 
In many ways the company’s sense of self-esteem 
and lack of vanity reflected its core merchandis-
ing principle: Liz Claiborne produced stylish (but 
not too trendy) clothes that actually fit working 
women.
Success Is Earned, Not An Entitlement
Liz Claiborne has not enabled a sense of entitle-
ment. Rather, the founders systematically devel-
oped an identity that prized teamwork and egal-
itarianism. Everyone mattered and enjoyed the 
benefit of friendly interpersonal relations, some-
thing that would not be possible in an organiza-
tion characterized by rigidly defined privileges for 
the few. Liz Claiborne was run as a business, and it 
enforced a kind of business discipline on the staff 
that contrasted sharply with the “prima donna” 
companies commonly found in the fashion indus-
try. For example, both executives and design staff 
routinely rode together to fitting sessions in a com-
pany van. The company as a whole did not feel it 
was entitled to special privileges. Rather, it took 
care to cultivate good relations with its suppli-
ers, and even when its clout in the industry might 
have allowed it to demand special consideration, 
Liz Claiborne had a reputation for being fair with 
its off-shore contractors: they didn’t oversample, 
didn’t withdraw orders, and didn’t make proto-
types in one factory then bring it to someone else 
for production.
Not Denying: We Need The Data
A reality-based organization is one where peo-
ple face the facts of their situation and accept 
responsibility. It does not enable the use of 
denial to avoid the facts or evade responsibility. 
For example, the Liz Claiborne company always 
took pride in listening to its customers. In 1987 it 
tried to re-introduce mini-skirt fashions, a con-
cept that consumers rejected, so it was quickly 
withdrawn. The company took pride in claiming 
that it would not participate in the exploitation of 
poor laborers. Nonetheless, in 1984, evidence sur-
faced among international human rights groups 
that a Liz Claiborne contractor was using a knit-
ting mill in China where employees received no 
more that sixty-one cents an hour, if they were 
paid at all. Instead of making excuses or stone-
walling, the company acknowledged its responsi-
bility and severed ties with the offending contrac-
tor. In analyzing the company’s difficulties in the 
early 1990s, company executives took ownership 
of the fact that their product lines had gotten stale 
and the company, as a whole had grown compla-
cent. A reality-based organization also knows that 
understanding “reality” requires understanding 
different points of view. Liz Claiborne expanded 
membership on both its Operating Commit-
tee and its Executive Committee specifically to 
ensure that different “realities” were represented. 
Denial is difficult to sustain in a heterogeneous 
environment.
The reality-based healthy narcissism at Liz Clai-
borne contrasts sharply with the high self-esteem 
narcissism at Enron where executives refused to 
“see” that many of their routine business prac-
tices were not just unethical, but were illegal. The 
low self-esteem narcissism at Salomon Brothers 
allowed executives to deny that their industry had 
changed.
Final comments
An organization’s identity makes tangible the col-
lectively shared values and assumptions that help 
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employees understand who they are as a group, 
how they got that way, and how they should 
behave. The distinctiveness of an identity can con-
tribute to an organization’s competitive advan-
tage, and this has been true for Liz Claiborne. In 
both good times and bad, a collective healthy sense 
of self-esteem and an identity that is reality based 
provided both an anchor in the present and a com-
pass to the future.
Recognizing that Liz Claiborne’s identity can be 
characterized as healthy narcissism underscores 
the idea that, in a sense, every organization is nar-
cissistic. Every organization believes it possesses 
special capabilities; every organization seeks favor-
able publicity; every organization will at times 
ignore unfavorable events; top decision makers in 
every organization occasionally make bad deci-
sions that they don’t want to own up to. But occa-
sional describes the normal, not the extreme. In 
the extreme case, healthy self-regard morphs into 
unhealthy self-obsession, and the reality base is 
lost. The grandiose, exhibitionistic narcissism at 
Enron and the inhibited, self-denying narcissism at 
Salomon Brothers resulted in system failure.
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